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**AMENDED CLD-151      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1473 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  NORMAN SHELTON, 
Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Prohibition from the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 12-cv-00422) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
March 14, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 23, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Norman Shelton, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, petitions for a writ of 
prohibition compelling the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania to rule on his motions for default judgment filed on November 19, 2012, 
November 21, 2012, and December 5, 2012.
1
  We will deny the petition. 
                                              
1
 Although Shelton requests a writ of prohibition, his relief would be more accurately 
classified as a writ of mandamus, because he asks us to mandate District Court action.  
Nevertheless, the form of his request does not affect the relief requested.  In re Sch. 
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Shelton is a federal prisoner incarcerated in the Special Management Unit of the 
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.  In March 2012, he brought a pro se Bivens 
action against several prison employees, alleging claims of excessive force, falsifying 
incident reports, interference with the courts, and destruction of property, among other 
similar claims.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Since he filed his complaint, Shelton has filed many motions for 
various forms of relief.  In particular, he sought a default judgment against the 
Defendants several times, for failing to timely respond to his complaint under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(a)(2-3).  The Defendants responded to two of the three motions referenced in 
the petition, and they are all now ripe for disposition.  The Defendants have also moved 
for dismissal, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
2
  That motion is now ripe for 
disposition as well. 
The writ of mandamus or prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, used to “compel 
[another court] to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”  Kerr v. U.S. Dist. 
Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  A petitioner seeking the writ “must have no other 
adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is 
                                                                                                                                                  
Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1313 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting the historical distinction 
between writs of mandamus and prohibition, but concluding that the “form [of request] is 
less important „than the substantive question of whether an extraordinary remedy is 
available.‟”). 
 
2
 Prior to filing the motion to dismiss/summary judgment, the Defendants filed a motion 
for an extension of time to file an answer.  It does not appear that the District Court ever 
ruled on that motion either. 
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clear and indisputable.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), superseded on 
other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c) (1997).  Generally, a court‟s management of its 
docket is discretionary.  In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 
1982).  Therefore, there is no “clear and indisputable” right to have the District Court 
handle a case in a certain manner.  See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 
36 (1980).  However, mandamus may be warranted where a district court‟s delay “is 
tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”   Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. 
In this case, even though the District Court has not made a ruling for more than 
seven and a half months, the most recent motions—including the motions for which 
Shelton is seeking mandamus relief—have been ripe for disposition for less than four 
months.  Shelton‟s most recent motion and the Defendants‟ dismissal request have been 
ripe for a little over one month.  This period of time does not rise to the level of undue 
delay and does not warrant our intervention.  See id.  We express our confidence that the 
District Court‟s docket management practices will not unduly defer disposition of any 
pending motions.  Appellees‟ motion to revoke Shelton‟s in forma pauperis (IFP) status is 
denied.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that true 
mandamus petitions are not subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, including its 
three strikes requirement).   
 
